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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to determine the competitiveness of clove commodities in Tolitoli Regency in 
terms of competitive and comparative advantages and to determine the impact of government 
policies on the sustainability of clove farming in Tolitoli Regency. The method of determining 
respondents used a simple random sampling method and obtained as many as 87 samples of 
clove farmers. The data analysis method used was the Multi-Period PAM (Policy Analysis 
Matrix). The results of this study indicate that the clove commodity in Tolitoli Regency had 
competitiveness in terms of competitive and comparative advantages with a PCR value of 
0.415 and DRCR 0.412. The impact of government policies on the output of clove farming in 
Tolitoli was protective against farming systems with an NPCO value of 1.088, but tent to be 
weak. While on the other hand, the impact of government policies on clove farming inputs was 
unprotective with an NPCI value of 1.061, meaning that farmers have not received positive 
incentives from the current input subsidy policy. The impact of government policies on input-
output as a whole was protective and provided positive incentives to farmers, but the value of 
the coefficient shows the level of protection that was still relatively weak and very vulnerable 
if there is a change in policy. The regional government is expected to provide protection to 
clove farmers in the form of setting the cost of clove purchases and also to exercise strict 
supervision of cartel practices in the clove trade system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades clove trade has 
been able to impact economic 
development in the Asian region (Cortés-
Rojas et al., 2014). However, clove plants 
in Indonesia currently face several 
challenges in its sustainability including 
competition in the conversion of land to 
other commodities such as oil palm and 
nutmeg (Santoso, 2019). In international 
trade, although Indonesia is known as 
the world's largest clove producer 
country, the competitiveness of 
Indonesia's clove commodities is still 
lagging behind other countries such as 
Madagascar and Comoros, one of the 
main causes is the low productivity 
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policies are urgently needed to support 
the sustainability of clove commodities 
which often face constraints on price 
instability, low productivity and 
challenges in meeting domestic and 
international needs (Indriyani et al., 
2020). 
Tolitoli Regency is one of the 
districts known as the Clove-producing 
Center in Central Sulawesi and even in 
Indonesia with an area of 37,720 ha with 
the highest production achievement in 
2017 which reached 10,276.28 tons. The 
realization of inter-island clove trade in 
Tolitoli in 2016 was 8,785.55 tons, an 
increase of 35.87% compared to the 
conditions in 2015, where the realization 
of inter-island clove trade was only 
5,634.1 tons (BPS Kabupaten Tolitoli, 
2018).  
Clove plants are plantations that 
have an important role in the economy of 
the community, especially farmers in 
Tolitoli Regency, but clove farmers are 
always faced with the classic problem 
that always makes farmers lose before 
the harvest, namely price fluctuation. 
According to Masengi et al. (2015) the 
characteristics of clove plants can only be 
harvested a maximum of 1 or 2 years and 
the harvest is 4 years, high production in 
a certain year will be followed by a 
decrease in the production of the next 1 
or 2 years so that sometimes scarcity 
occurs but often there is also an 
oversupply so that prices often plummet. 
In addition to the problem of low 
productivity, the problem of falling 
prices before the main harvest is often 
faced by clove farmers in Tolitoli 
Regency, this is due to monopsony 
market conditions. Wahyudi (2016a) 
stated that around  95% of clove 
production was used for the cigarette 
industry and the rest for food and spices. 
The large percentage of clove uptake by 
the kretek cigarette industry left farmers 
short of choices in marketing their 
products so that the cigarette industry 
had considerable authority in price 
monopolies. Currently Indonesia is also 
known as the main supplier of global 
clove essential oil to several countries in 
such as Saudi Arabia, India, Vietnam and 
United States (Bustaman, 2016). 
According to Kingu (2014) the 
motivation of farmers in maintaining 
clove plants is very much influenced by 
fluctuations in clove prices, especially in 
the export market.  
Research related to the impact of 
government policies on the 
competitiveness of agricultural 
commodities using the Policy Analysis 
Matrix has been done quite a lot in 
Indonesia both for food crops, 
horticulture, and plantations, but prior 
research related to clove 
competitiveness and the impact of 
government policies is still lacking. This 
can be caused by clove being a plantation 
that has a long life span, so to conduct 
research and find out its competitiveness 
comprehensive data covering the age of 
the plant is needed. One of the studies 
that may be relevant to this research is a 
research conducted by (Indriyani et al., 
2020) found out that clove farming  had  
a comparative and competitive 
advantage but the government policies 
were disincentives to output, no 
protection policies for inputs, ineffective 
government incentive policies and no 
additional producer surpluses. 
Based on the description of the 
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study is to evaluate the impact of existing 
government policies on the clove 
plantation sector in Tolitoli Regency. The 
Policy Analysis Matrix (PAM) is a method 
of analysis approach that examines the 
effect of price policies and investment 
policies on agricultural productivity. The 
results of the PAM analysis can show 
both individual and collective effects of 
price policies and domestic factor 
policies. PAM also provides basic 
information that is important for Benefit-
Cost Analysis for investment activities in 
agriculture (Pearson et al., 2005). The 
novelty of this study compared to the 
previous studies is that it employs a PAM 
multi-period approach which is a more 
in-depth analysis and is slightly different 
from a single PAM period because in a 
multi-period PAM the analysis is carried 




The research location was chosen 
purposively, in which the research was 
conducted in Tolitoli Regency, Central 
Sulawesi Province with the 
consideration that Tolitoli Regency is the 
center of the largest clove commodity 
producers in Central Sulawesi, both in 
terms of production and land area. The 
multistage cluster sampling method was 
used to select Baolan District and 
Ogodeide District as a sample of research 
areas from 10 existing sub-districts with 
the consideration that the two Districts 
were the highest clove production 
centers in Tolitoli Regency. Samples 
were collected using the Slovin method 
(Prasada & Masyhuri, 2019), based on 
the calculation of the Slovin method, 
from a population of 675, a total sample 
of 87 people was obtained with a 
proportion of 65 respondents in Baolan 
District and 22 respondents in Ogodeide 
District. 
The type of data used in this study 
was primary data and secondary data. 
Primary data was obtained directly from 
the source using a questionnaire from 
clove farmers, traders, experts related to 
clove agriculture, stakeholders, and clove 
agriculture institutions. Secondary data 
was obtained by collecting information 
in the form of documents and reports 
that can be obtained from the Central 
Statistics Agency, the Director-General of 
Plantations, the Plantation and Livestock 
Services Office of Tolitoli Regency, 
UNComtrade, Bank Indonesia and other 
supporting sources. 
The data collected was then 
analyzed using the Policy Analysis Matrix 
(PAM) Method used to measure the 
impact of policies on producer income 
and identifying transfers between 
producers and consumers as the main 
actors involved in the agricultural 
system as well as policymakers in 
controlling government budget 
allocations. Stages carried out in PAM 
analysis included (1) determination of 
input-output in farming, (2) allocation of 
inputs into tradable and non-tradable 
components (3) method of determining 
shadow prices, (4) determining the 
competitiveness of a commodity in terms 
of excellence comparative (economic 
efficiency) and competitive advantage 
(financial efficiency) and the impact of 
government policy interventions on a 
commodity system (Table 1). 
PAM table consisted of a revenue 
column, two input cost columns 
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The first line of the PAM matrix shows 
the calculation concerning the private 
price, that is, the actual price received or 
paid by the producer. The second line 
shows the calculation by referring to the 
social price or the shadow price which is 
the price that describes the real 
economic value of the input and output. 
The third line shows the transfer effect 
that illustrates the impact of government 
policy on input-output and market 
failure (Suhardedi et al., 2017). 
 







Private Price A B C D = A – B – C 
Social Price E F G H = E – F – G 
Policy Impact I = A – E J = B – F K = C – G L = D – H = I – J – K 
Source : Pearson et al., (2005) 
Note: 
Private Profitability (D) = A – (B+C) 
Social Profitability (H) = E – (F+G) 
Private Cost Ratio (PCR) = C / (A – B) 
Domestic Resource Cost Ratio (DRCR) = 
G / (E – F) 
Ouput Transfer (I) = A – E 
Nominal Protection Coefficient on 
Output (NPCO) = A / E 
Input Transfer (J) = B – F 
Nominal Protection Coefficient on Input 
(NPCI) = B / F 
Transfer Factor (K) = C – G 
Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) = A 
– B / B – F 
Net Transfer (L) = D – H 
Inputs in this study included land, 
seeds, labor, fertilizer, pesticides, tools 
and agricultural machinery. The output 
produced in this study was in the form of 
dried clove flowers. Determination of the 
allocation of inputs into foreign and 
domestic components can be seen in 
table 2. 
 
Table 2. Determination of Clove Farming Input Allocation into Domestic and Foreign 
Components 
Component Domestic (%) Foreign (%) 
Seeds 
































Source: *(APPI, 2019); **Input-Output Indonesia (2008) in (Arfah et al., 
2017),***(Saputro et al., 2017) 
Shadow prices or social prices are 
the prices formed in an economy under 
conditions of perfect competition and 
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was calculated to determine shadow 
price. The shadow price for tradable 
commodities, both input, and output, was 
calculated using the FOB (Free on Board) 
limit approach, namely the price of goods 
arriving at the export port, while for 
imported commodities using the CIF 
(Cost Insurance Freight) price limit, 
namely the price of goods arriving at the 
import port. The method  determining 
the Shadow Exchange Rate uses the 
Squire and Van der Tak methods 







SER  : Shadow exchange rate 
(IDR/US$) 
OER  : Official exchange rate 
(IDR/US$) 
SCFt  : Standard conversion factor 
 
The SCF (Standard Conversion 
Factor) value is the ratio of the value of 
imports and exports plus tax which is 
formulated as follows: 
SCFt = 
Xt + Mt
(Xt - Txt)+ (Mt + Tmt)
 
Where : 
SCFt : Standard conversion factor for 
year - t 
Xt  : Indonesia’s export value for 
year-t (IDR) 
Mt  : Indonesia’simport value for 
year-t (IDR) 
Txt  : Government revenue from 
export tax for year-t (IDR) 
Tmt  : Government revenue from 
import tax for year-t (IDR) 
Clove plantations are annual 
plantations for plants that require a long 
period from the time of preparing the 
land, planting to harvest time which must 
reflect representative results that can 
describe the full competitiveness of 
cloves. Thus, it is necessary to apply a 
multi-period method PAM (Setiawan & 
Sengadji, 2016). The PAM multi-period 
method requires calculating the total net 
present value (NPV) according to the 
economic age of the plant. Furthermore, 









Bt =  Benefit for year-t 
Ct = Cost for year-t 
1/(1 + i)t = Discount factor 
t =  year ( 1,2,3,.... n ) 
n = farming period 
Each NPV calculation model was 
applied to the private and social prices, 
then the results of the NPV calculation 
are entered into a single PAM matrix 
period for analysis based on PAM 
indicators in general. The results of the 
interpretation of the PAM single period 
and the multi-period PAM are the same, 
which show the total profit and 
divergence during that period (Pearson 
et al., 2005). 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Government policy can be one of 
the determinants of efficiency in 
economic activity. Among the policies 
that have been carried out by the 
government in the clove farming sector 
so far on the input side are input 
subsidies in the subsidized fertilizer 
program, while in terms of output there 
is no real policy in protecting the farmers 
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Private Price  174,956,203   20,271,805   64,172,610  90,511,787  
Social Price  160,783,171   19,108,962   58,372,308  83,301,902  
Policy Impact  14,173,031   1,162,843   5,800,303  7,209,885  
Source: Primary Data Analysis, 2020 
addition to the clove import ban policy 
that it was implemented in 2002 which 
was revoked in 2015. This paper 
examines the efficiency of policies that 
take place in the clove farming sector 
with the Multi Period Policy Analysis 
Matrix approach 
The PAM table used in this study 
was derived from the multi-period 
calculation of PAM by calculating the 
revenue, costs, and benefits according to 
the economic age of the plant for 20 
years. The data then became an indicator 
of the competitiveness and policy impact 
of the clove farming system. The 
following table of PAM from the clove 
farming system for 20 years in Tolitoli 
Regency can be seen in Table 3. 
 
Competitive and Comparative 
Advantages of Clove Commodities in 
Tolitoli Regency 
The indicators used to determine 
the competitive and comparative 
advantage of a commodity were Private 
Cost Ratio (PCR) and Domestic 
Resources Cost Ratio (DRCR) (Mallu et 
al., 2018). PCR and DRCR values are also 
able to illustrate the efficiency of a 
farming system in terms of both financial 
and economic aspects. Financial 
efficiency describes the efficiency that 
occurs in private prices, while economic 
efficiency is based on the prices received 
or paid by farmers in conditions without 
market distortion (Nurwahidah et al., 
2015). Values of PCR and DRCR of clove 
commodities in Tolitoli Regency for 20 
years can be seen in Table 4. 
Table 4 shows that the value of the 
Privatee Cost Ratio (PCR) of clove 
commodities in Tolitoli Regency was 
0.415 or less than one (PCR <1) which 
means clove commodities in Tolitoli 
Regency have competitive advantages 
and can compete at national and global 
levels even with the presence of 
government distortion or interference, 
the lower the value of PCR shows the 
stronger competitive competitiveness of 
a commodity. A PCR value of 0.415 can 
also be interpreted that to increase one 
unit of value-added output at the private 
price, it should incur additional domestic 
input costs at the private price of 0.415 
(Haryanto et al., 2019). 
 
Table 4. Indicators of Competitive and Comparative Excellence in Clove Farming in 
Tolitoli Regency 
Indicators Value 
Private Cost Ratio (PCR) 0.415 
Domestic Resources Cost Ratio (DRCR) 0.412 
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The value of the Domestic 
Resources Cost Ratio (DRCR) of clove 
commodities in Tolitoli Regency was 
0.412 or less than one (DRCR <1) which 
means that clove commodities in Tolitoli 
Regency have a comparative or 
economically efficient advantage with 
the assumption that in conditions there 
was no distortion or no government 
hand interference. It also shows that 
clove commodities are more profitable if 
they are produced domestically rather 
than imported from abroad because the 
production costs must be lower than if 
they must be imported (Putri et al., 
2019). PCR value of 0.412 can also be 
interpreted that to produce one unit of 
cloves in the country only requires the 
cost of domestic input at a social price of 
0.412 so that it will save on import costs 
of 0.588.  
 
Impact of Output Policy 
The impact of government policies 
in Table 5 shows that the value of Output 
Transfer (OT) was positive (OT > 0) in 
the amount of IDR. 14,173,031. This 
condition can be interpreted that the 20-
year government policy in the clove 
farming sector in Tolitoli Regency as a 
whole can provide positive incentives to 
farmers as producers and there has been 
a transfer from the consumer community 
to farmers or producers, even if it is 
examined further in some certain years 
there are policies that make farmers lose 
money many times and even they have to 
cut down their clove plants, such as the 
existence of BPPC in the 1990s and 
export-import regulations which were 
not so strict in controlling the entry of 
clove products from abroad into the 
country which often lowered prices at 
the farmer's level. 
Nominal Protection Coefficient 
Output (NPCO) based on Table 5 shows 
that the value of NPCO was greater than 
one (NPCO> 1) that was equal to 1.088. It 
shows that the government policy on 
clove farming in Tolitoli Regency for 20 
years was protective or this reflects that 
the overall price of domestic output was 
higher than the output price at the 
international level. Although the overall 
policy was protective, the NPCO value 
was almost close to the number one that 
reflects that the level of protection still 
tends to be weak. The role of the local 
government is also needed in this regard 
to encourage the community motivation 
to properly maintain the clove plants. It 
is because Tolitoli Regency ranks first in 
producing cloves in Indonesia in terms of 
production since 2016 (Direkorat 
Jenderal Perkebunan, 2017).  
The fact occurred at the study site 
shows that the level of protection from 
the Tolitoli Regional Government against 
clove farmers on their own clove 
products tends to be weak. Trading 
conditions at the regional level where 
there are only one or two large traders 
who have the authority to export cloves 
out of the region make the market
 
Table 5. Indicators of Policy Impacts on Clove Farming Output in Tolitoli Regency 
Indicators Value 
Output Transfer (OT) 14,173,031 
Nominal Protection Coefficient Output(NPCO) 1.088 
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structure become monopsonistic and 
suppress prices at the farm level, 
triggering price disparity.  
It requires several elements of the 
community such as farmers, farmer 
organizations, and Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) to voice these 
conditions to the government so that the 
local government issues a regulation 
through Decree of the Regent No. 337 
2019 on July 16, which sets the standard 
cost of clove purchases at IDR 100,000 / 
kg. Since the issuance of the decree, there 
have not been any concrete steps taken 
by the regional government to realize 
this, so what has happened to date has 
remained following market mechanisms.  
According to Siregar (2011) clove 
is a commodity that is very vulnerable to 
price fluctuations, clove prices can surge 
up to 200% and vice versa can drop 
dramatically in a percentage that does 
not differ much from the increase. The 
Indonesian Government once limited the 
import of cloves through Regulation of 
the Minister of Industry and Trade No. 7 
of 2002 even though this contradicted 
the World Trade Organization agreement 
(Suprihanti et al., 2018). 
The impact of the policy makes the 
price of cloves reach IDR 120,000/kg – 
IDR 130,000/kg, however in 2015 the 
government re-issued a policy in the 
Minister of Trade Regulation of 
(Permendag) Number 75 of 2015 which 
regulates the liberalization of clove 
imports so that the price of cloves in the 
country dropped to IDR 70,000/kg. 
According to the Indonesian Clove 
Farmers Association (APCI), it is 
considered to be very pressing and 
detrimental to the clove farmers because 
it causes domestic clove prices to be low 
and farmers lose the opportunity to 
enjoy the proper price they should have 
obtained. 
 
Impact of Input Policies 
The impact of government policies 
in Table 6 shows that the value of Input 
Transfer (IT) was positive (IT> 0) in the 
amount of IDR 1,162,843, in which the 
cost of private tradable inputs was 
greater than the costs of social tradable 
inputs. It shows that there was a transfer 
from producer farmers to tradable input 
producers meaning that farmers have to 
pay more to obtain tradable inputs. 
This condition is certainly in 
conflict with or not in line with the input 
subsidy policy that has been set by the 
government in the form of a subsidized 
fertilizer program since 2003 through 
the Minister of Industry and Trade 
Decree Number 70 / MPP / Kep / 2/2003 
to support efforts to achieve agricultural 
production targets. The types of 
fertilizers included in the subsidized 
fertilizer category include Urea, NPK-
Phonska, SP36, ZA, and organic fertilizer, 
but the policies implemented by the 
government to provide incentives to 
farmers often occur that subsidies were 
not on target and in distribution there 
was often smuggling (Darwis & Supriyati, 
2014). Existing input subsidy policies 
have not been able to provide positive 
incentives for the clove farming system 
in Tolitoli Regency for 20 years. Frequent 
fraud and misuse of subsidized fertilizer 
in the field make it often difficult for 
farmers to obtain fertilizer and if 
available the price is higher than it 
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Table 6. Indicators of Policy Impacts on Clove Farming Input in Tolitoli Regency 
Indicators Value 
Input Transfer (IT) 1,162,843  
Nominal Protection Coefficient Input (NPCI) 
Transfer Factor (TF) 
1.061 
5,800,303  
Source: Primary Data Analysis, 2020 
Nominal Protection Coefficient 
Input (NPCI) based on Table 6 shows that 
the value of NPCI was greater than one 
(NPCI> 1), which was 1.061. It shows that 
farmers must incur more expensive 
input costs because the price of domestic 
tradable input is higher than the price of 
tradable input at the international level 
(Haryono et al., 2011). Domestic tradable 
input prices were 6.1% more expensive 
than tradable input prices at the 
international level. Overall, the 
government's policy towards tradable 
input of clove farming in Tolitoli Regency 
for 20 years was unprotective or had not 
been able to provide positive incentives 
for tradable inputs in the clove farming 
system. 
Based on Table 6 shows that the TF 
value was positive (TF> 0) in the amount 
of IDR 5,800,303, it indicates that there is 
a transfer from producer farmers to non-
tradable input producers or farmers 
must pay higher costs because there 
were negative subsidies in the form of 
taxes clove farmers must bear the non 
tradable inputs. Components of non-
tradable input costs that required higher 
costs by clove farmers at the study site 
are labor costs and harvesting 
equipment in the form of bamboo 
ladders. This is because the availability of 
labor or harvest workers available at the 
study site was increasingly scarce, so 
farmers often brought in labor from the 
subdistrict or neighboring district 
causing wages to rise, as well as 
harvesting tools for farmers who still 
used traditional tools such as bamboo 
ladders which recently are increasingly 
hard to find. 
Impact of Input - Output Policies 
The Effective Protection 
Coefficient (EPC) coefficient is useful to 
know the extent of the impact of 
government policy in supporting or 
hampering farmers in their farm 
management. Based on Table 7 it is 
known that the value of the EPC was 
more than one (EPC>1) of 1.092, which 
means if it is accumulated for the whole 
20 years, the government policy was 
protective for the clove farming system 
in Tolitoli Regency. As one of the largest 
clove producing regions in Indonesia, the 
government should support the 
sustainability of the farming system so 
that it continues to produce. This 
certainly needs to be synchronized 
between the central government and 
regional governments in a tangible form. 
Table 7 shows that the Net 
Transfer value of clove farming in Tolitoli 
Regency was positive (NT>0) in the 
amount of IDR 7,209,885, which means 
that government policies were protective 
for the clove farming system and farmers 
get a producer surplus of IDR.7,209,885 
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Table 7. Indicators of Policy Impacts on Clove Farming Input and Output in Tolitoli 
Regency 
Indicators Value 
Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC) 1.092 
Net Transfer (NT) 7,209,885 
Source: Primary Data Analysis, 2020 
The weak level of protection will 
be very vulnerable to the threat of policy 
distortion, the entry of imported 
products of the same type at lower prices 
needs to be watched by the government 
as a regulator of policy makers with due 
regard to tax regulations and subsidies 
(Dos Santos Alves et al., 2017). The 
characteristics of clove production which 
fluctuated every year also need to be 
reviewed by applying supply chain 
management so that production 
fluctuations do not have a significant 
effect on falling clove prices at the farmer 
level Wahyudi (2016b). 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
The clove farming system in 
Tolitoli Regency for 20 years has shown 
that clove commodities had 
competitiveness in terms of competitive 
or comparative advantage. The impact of 
government policies on the output of 
clove farming in Tolitoli was protective, 
but tent to be weak and needed to be 
strengthened. While on the other hand 
the impact of government policies on 
clove farming inputs was unprotective, 
meaning that farmers had not received 
positive incentives from the current 
input subsidy policy. The impact of 
government policies on input-output as a 
whole was protective and provided 
positive incentives to farmers, but the the 
coefficient that tent to approach the 
efficient limit indicates the level of 
protection that was still relatively weak 
and very vulnerable if there was a change 
in policy. 
The regional government is 
expected to be able to provide protection 
to farmers as the main producers of 
cloves in the form of  interventions to 
determine the clove floor prices and 
supervising the implementation. The 
regional government must carry out 
strict supervision on cartel practices in 
the clove trade system which causes the 
clove market to be monopsony and 
evaluate the fertilizer subsidy policy by 
replacing the application of the farmer 
card mechanism so that the benefits of 
the subsidies are immediately felt by 
farmers and intensifying and supervising 
the distribution of subsidized fertilizer to 
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